Critical notice of Ernest Sosa’s judgement and agency by Pritchard, Duncan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical notice of Ernest Sosa’s judgement and agency
Citation for published version:
Pritchard, D 2017, 'Critical notice of Ernest Sosa’s judgement and agency' Journal of Philosophy, vol. 114,
no. 5, pp. 274-276. DOI: 10.5840/jphil2017114520
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.5840/jphil2017114520
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Journal of Philosophy
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the peer-reviewed version of the following article: Pritchard, D 2017, 'Critical notice of Ernest Sosa’s
judgement and agency' Journal of Philosophy, vol 114, no. 5, pp. 274-276, which has been published in final
form at http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2017114520. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes only.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 For The Journal of Philosophy 
Review of Ernest Sosa, Judgment and Agency, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 
269 + vi).  
 
 
Ernest Sosa’s latest monograph, Judgment and Agency, is an incredibly important work of 
contemporary epistemology. Part of its importance resides in the fact that it develops the 
general virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology that Sosa has spearheaded over several 
decades, and which is the most sophisticated version of its kind. But this book is not merely an 
incremental extension of Sosa’s previous work in this field, since it substantially modifies, and in 
the process enhances, the view. Sosa offers us a detailed metaphysical account of judgement as 
an exercise of cognitive agency, and engages with a range of further issues that are crucial to 
our appreciation of his distinctive brand of virtue epistemology, such as the historical 
antecedents of his proposal.  
 There is so much to admire in this book, and yet a decent review demands some 
critique. Since space is short, I will cut to the chase and focus on one element of Sosa’s view 
that I think is problematic (even though I must admit to being nonetheless somewhat attracted 
to his alternative picture). This concerns the account of epistemic risk that he outlines, and the 
role of his virtue epistemology with regard to the elimination of such risk. 
 First, I want to signal the angle from which I am approaching this problem. I maintain 
that the reason why we hold that knowledge is incompatible with veritic luck (i.e., whereby it is 
a matter of luck that one’s belief is true, given how one formed it), is because of our concern to 
eliminate high levels of epistemic risk. Very roughly, I claim that assessments of (bad) epistemic 
luck and epistemic risk are simply two different perspectives that one can take on the same 
epistemic event. In the former case, one is evaluating the target epistemic event in question in a 
backwards-looking fashion, one where the cognitive success has occurred. In the latter case, 
one is evaluating the target epistemic event in a forwards-looking fashion, where one considers 
the high risk that the cognitive success might have been a cognitive failure instead. Nonetheless, 
although we can adopt these two perspectives on the same epistemic event, our concern to 
eliminate veritic luck is because of our concern to avoid high levels of epistemic risk (i.e., rather 
than vice versa).1 
 I think this point is important because Sosa adopts a rather sanguine approach to the 
possibility that one’s knowledge can be both bona fide and also subject to epistemic luck. He 
argues, for example (pp. 117-123), that one can know that one’s lottery ticket is a loser simply 
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by reflecting on the odds involved, even though such a belief, so formed, could clearly have 
easily been wrong. Similarly, his response to the Gettier-style barn-façade case is to attribute 
knowledge, even though the belief, so formed, could have easily been wrong (e.g., p. 79). My 
point, however, is that such a permissive approach to veritic epistemic luck carries over into a 
correspondingly permissive approach to epistemic risk. After all, taking a forwards-looking 
perspective, given how these beliefs were formed they could have easily resulted in a false belief.  
 Sosa sometimes accounts for how certain kinds of epistemic risk are compatible with 
knowledge by appealing to different levels of epistemic appraisal, such that while knowledge at 
one level is present, knowledge at another level is absent. So, for example, while the subject has 
knowledge in the barn façade case, she does not exhibit the more refined epistemic standing of 
knowing full well. This is an intriguing suggestion, and admittedly does go some way towards 
diagnosing why the standard line on these cases is not to attribute knowledge. But I don’t think 
that it is enough once we put the point in terms of epistemic risk. How could bona fide 
propositional knowledge, of any grade, be compatible with high levels of epistemic risk? 
 In some places, Sosa takes the line that what level of reliability or exclusion of risk (he 
tends to run both together) is required for knowledge can vary from situation to situation (e.g., 
pp. 126-28). Accordingly, he could argue that although there is epistemic risk in these cases, it 
is sufficiently low to clear the relevant threshold for this epistemic performance.  
 But I do not find this proposal at all plausible. After all, notice that the level of epistemic 
risk is extremely high, in that it is characteristic of these cases that the risk event in 
question⎯i.e., that one ends up forming a false belief by employing that same belief-forming 
process⎯is modally very close. Put another way, while we might grant that the degree of 
epistemic risk that is compatible with knowledge might vary from case to case, it is a stretch to 
say that knowledge can in any situation be compatible with a very high degree of epistemic risk.  
 For example, imagine that one discovered that the plane on which one was flying was 
such that, unlike all other commercial planes, it would immediately fall from the sky if struck by 
lightening. Suppose further that one knows enough about meteorology to know that while 
being hit by lightening is a low-probability event, it is nonetheless something that could easily 
happen. The conditions for a lightening strike, let us say, are such that when in flight one is 
always in a situation whereby one could easily occur. Wouldn’t we think that such a flight was 
high risk? No doubt there will be contexts where we will be willing to take this risk⎯such as 
when one’s life depends on catching the flight⎯but that wouldn’t undermine the high degree 
of risk in play. The crux of the matter is that if a certain risk event⎯in this case one’s plane 
 3 
falling out of the sky⎯is modally very close, then we tend to judge that we are subject to 
unduly high levels of risk, regardless of the other details of one’s situation.  
Applied to the epistemic case, this suggests that we should be very wary of allowing 
knowledge to be compatible with the high level of epistemic risk in play in lottery-style and 
barn façade-style cases. Moreover, I think that we can diagnose Sosa’s failure to see this in 
terms of how he doesn’t appreciate how epistemic luck and epistemic risk are related. That is, I 
grant that saying that there can be genuine knowledge that is nonetheless subject to veritic 
epistemic luck is not obviously false. The trouble arises once one recognises that the reason why 
we care about eliminating veritic epistemic luck is because we care about eliminating high 
levels of epistemic risk. For now it follows on Sosa’s view that there can be genuine knowledge 
that is nonetheless subject to high levels of epistemic risk. That, I submit, does seem obviously 
false.   
 This one aspect of Sosa’s position notwithstanding, the fact remains that this book 
stands head-and-shoulders above much of contemporary work in epistemology, and 
represents⎯in common with much of Sosa’s published work⎯a high-water mark as regards 
scholarship in this area. Anyone serious about epistemology ought to read this book.  
 
 
Duncan Pritchard 
University of Edinburgh 
duncan.pritchard@ed.ac.uk  
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NOTES 
 
1  I develop this account of epistemic risk, and how it relates to debates about epistemic luck, in Pritchard 
(forthcoming).  
